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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
of the opinion that there could never be social interests enough in favor
of applying this sort of regulation to any business, except one in which
there was virtual monopoly plus indispensable service, to outweigh the
opposing social interests.
The principal case is one of the most revolutionary ones decided by
the Supreme Court for years. It is difficult to tell just where it will lead.
If the control applied here can be imposed upon a private business under
the ordinary rules of police power, there is no logical reason why other
burdens, so far only borne by public callings, cannot likewise be imposed
upon private enterprises. Thus they might be made to serve everyone,
without discrimination, and to provide reasonably adequate facilities wherever the court is able to find sufficient social interests to justify the burden
under the ordinary rules of police power.
This decision is of particular interest at this time. It dispels much doubt
as to the constitutionality of the Domestic Allotment Bill and other legislation of a similar nature. It neems altogether possible that the court may
have been consciously paving the way for holding such plans constitutional.
W. H. H.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-ADMINISTRATYE DuTi s OF THE JUDIcIARY-DuE

PRocESS-Pursuant to the provisions of the Indiana Statute,1 the appellee
filed in the office of the clerk of the superior court, a certified copy of a
compensation agreement, executed by him and his employer, the appellant,
and approved by the Industrial Board. Appellee then petitioned for entry
of judgment. The court rendered the judgment and notified the appellant,
as required by statute. 2 The appellant then entered a special appearance
for the purpose of moving the court to vacate and set aside the judgment
heretofore rendered. The motion was overruled and appellant appeals on an
assignment of errors, contending that the statute authorizing the circuit or
superior court to render a judgment in accordance with the award of the
Industrial Board, without a hearing, was unconstitutional in that the said
statute3 imposed administrative duties upon the judiciary in violation of
Article III, Sec. 1 of the State Constitution and denied due process under
Article I, Sec. 12 of the State Constitution and amendment 14 of the Constitution of the United States. Held, that Section 62 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, providing for the rendition of judgment upon the award of
the Industrial Board without a hearing was not unconstitutional.
The appellant contends that the court's act of entering a judgment was
an administrative act, which is beyond the power of the courts, and therefore unconstitutional. 5 It has been held that the power of the courts is
limited to actual cases and controversies by the Federal Constitution.6
'Burns' Revised Statutes, 1926, Section 9507.
2 Supra, Note 1.
3Supra, Note. 2.
45 Grant Coal Mining Company v. Coleman (1932), 179 N. E. 778.
In re Atlantic Insurance Co. (N. Y. 1929), 232 N. Y. S. 489; In re Northwestern Indiana Telephone Co. (Ind. 1930), 171 N. E. 65 , State ex tel. and to Use of
Kansas City & So. .. Co. v. Public Service Co. (Mo. 1930), 30 S. W. (2nd) 112.
6 United States 'v. Ferreira(1851), 18 Hrow. 40; Gordon v. United States (1864),
2 Wall. 561; Trega v. Modesto Irrigation District (1896), 164 U. S. 179, 17 Sp. Ct.
52; Muskrat v. United States (1910), 219 U. G. 349, 31 Sp. Ct. 282; Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis (1927), 277 U. S. 274, 48 Sp. Ct 507.

RECENT CASE NOTES
The court in the instant case tacitly acquiesced in that view, but stated that
the Constitution of Indiana nowhere limits the function of the courts to hearing and determining actual cases and controversies. It is submitted that,
even though the State Constitution does not specifically limit the courts to
hearing and determining actual cases and controversies, nevertheless, it
seems logical to conclude that the courts are bound by that limitation; and
that declaratory judgments, requiring that the plaintiff have a suitable action and a definite legal interest capable and worthy of judicial protection,
that the defendant must have an adverse interest, and that the judgment,
7
definitely affecting legal relations placed in issue, be res adjudicata, come
within the limitations of actual cases and controversies. But regardless of
whether or not declaratory judgments are classed as actual cases and controversies, they have been held valid in EnglandS and in many state jurisdictions. 9 Only one state jurisdiction'O and the United States Supreme
Court" have held declaratory judgments unconstitutional, and the state
12
In actual practice, both the
decision has been overruled by a later case.
declaratory judgments under
rendered
have
courts
the
federal
state and
such titles as proceedings to determine the validity of bonds;13 for the
declaration of legitimacy, and the validity or nullity of marriage and divorce;14 to enjoin the payment of illegal tax;15 to allow a state in a criminal case to appeal to a higher court to decide the rule of law for future
cases;' 6 for the declaration of heirship;17 bills of interpleader;lS and to
determine boundary lines.1 9 To hold declaratory judgments unconstitu7 West v. Wichita (Kans. 1925), 234 Pac. 978; Revis v. Daugherty (Ky. 1926),
287 S. W. 28; Tanner v. Boynton Lumber Co. (N. 3. 1925), 129 At. 617; In re
Kariher's Petition (Pa. 1925), 131 At. 265; Miller v. Miller (Tenn. 1923), 261 S.
W. 965.
8 Northwestern Marine Eng. Co. v. Leeds Forge Co. (1906), 1 Ch. 324; Williams
v. North Navigation Colliers (1889), 2 K. B. 44; Dyson v. Atty. General (1910),
1 K. B. 410.
9Morton v. Pacific Constr. Corp. (Ariz. 1929), 283 Pac. 281; BlakelesS v. Wilson (Col. 1923), 213 Paa. 495; Braman v. Babcock (Conn. 1923) 120 AtI. 150;
Sheldon v. Powell (Fla. 1930), 128 So. 258; Zoercher v. Agler (Ind. 1930), 172 N.
E. 186; State ex rel. Hopkins v. Grove (Kans. 1921), 201 Pac. 82; Washington Detroit Theatre Co. v. Braunstein (N. J. 1926), 134 At. 752; Board of Education v.
Van Zandt (N. Y. 1922), 195 N. Y. S. 297.
'Anaway v. Grand Rapids R. R. Co. (Mich. 1919), 179 N. W. 350.
Supra, Note. 6.
Washington Detroit Theatre Co. v. Moore (Mich. 1930), 229 N. W. 618.
13 Crall v. Poso IrrigationDistrict (1890), 87 Cal. 140, 26 Pac. 797; Nanmpa IrrigationDist. v. Brose (1905), 11 Idaho 474, 83 Paa. 499.
11
itzinan v. Eitzman (Wis. 1918), 116 N. W. 789; Tillinghast v. Tillinghast
(1928), 25 Fed. (2nd) 531.
9
' Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. and Others (1910), 220 U. S. 107; Corbus v. Gold
Mining Co. (1902), 187 U. S. 455; Brushaber v. Union Pac. R. R. Co. (1915), 240
U. S. 1.
10State v. Allen (Kans. 1920), 191 Pac. 476; State v. Laughlin (1908), 171 Ind.
66, 84 N. E. 756; State v. Willingham (Miss. 1905), 86 Miss. 203, 38 So. 334; State
v. Gilbert (1908), 138 Ia. 335, 116 N. W. 142; State v. Frisbie (1912), 8 Okla. Cr.
406, 127 P. 1091; State v. Spears (1916), 123 Ark. 444, 185 S. W. 788; Commw. v.
Bruce (1881), 79 Ky. 560.
7
Fitzpatrick v. Simonson Bros. Mfg. Co. (Minn. 1902), 90 N. W. 378; Miller
v. Clausen (1924), 299 Fed. 723.
I Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. De Lasaux (Ill. 1929), 168 N. D. 640.
'9 Louisiana v. Mississippi (1906), 202 U. S. 1; Arkansas v. Tennessee (1918),
246 U. S. 158, 38 Sp. Ct. Rep. 301; Georgia v. South Carolina (1922), 257 U. S. 516,
42 Sp. CL 73.
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tional is to hold that we must breach some legal duty, such as a contract,
before we can procure a judicial pronouncement. Such a view is not in
harmony with any concept of justice. However in the instant case, the
rendition of the judgment was not an administrative, but a judicial action,
based upon an award by the Industrial board, a quasi-judicial tribunal. The
rendition of such judgment was just as much a judicial action as the rendition of declaratory judgments. The award of the Board was an evidence
of liability similar to that of the verdict of a jury and as in the case of a
jury verdict required the entering of the judgment by the court to enforce
the resultant legal rights of the parties pursuant to the provisions of the
Legislative Act.20 Therefore since one of the judicial functions is to determine the application of substantive law to specific facts, there should be no
question as to the judicial nature of the rendition of the judgment on the
award of the Industrial Board.
As to the appellants contention that it was a denial of due process under
both the State and the Federal Constitutions, 21 for the court to render
judgment without notice and a full hearing, it is submitted that the finality
of the award of the Industrial Board depends upon whether or not an essential jurisdictional fact or question of substantive law is denied in a matter, which involves a constitutional right. If such jurisdictional fact or
question of substantive law is involved and properly asserted, then, under
due process, the judicial power necessarily extends to the independent determination of all questions as to both law and fact.22 The case of confiscation
is illustrative, in which the United States Supreme Court has held the
owner to be entitled to a fair opportunity for submitting that issue to a
judicial tribunal for determination upon its own independent judgment as
to both law and fact. 23 The case of deportation of persons claiming to be
citizens of the United States is also illustrative in that such persons are
24
entitled to a judicial determination of their claims.
However, apart from these cases, which involve constitutional rights, the
findings of the administrative commission will be final, if the proper procedure, which guarantees a notice and a full hearing before an impartial
tribunal, has been followed and the commission or Board has acted within
the scope of its authority.25 The notice and the hearing need not be in a
uBrown v. George A. Fuller Co. (Mich. 1916), 159 N. W. 376; Stuart MoNicol
(Dependents) Case (Mass. 1913), 102 N. E. 697; Railroad Labor Board v. Robertson (1924), 3 Fed. (2nd) 488.
"Article 1, No. 12, Constitution of State of Indiana, Amendment 14, Constitution of the United States.
= Ohio Valley v. Ben Avon Borough (1919), Pa. 253 U. S. 287, 40 Sp. Ct. 527;
2u Fung Ho. v. White (1922), 259 U. S. 276, 42 Sp. Ct. 492; Prendengastv. Y. Y.
Telephone Co. (1923) 262 U. S. 43, 43 Sp. Ct. 466; Tagg Bros. v. Moorehead (1929) ;
280 U. S. 420, 50 Sp. Ct. 608; Phillips -v. Commissioner (1930), 283 U. S. 589, 51 Sp.
Ct. 608.
"Bluefleld Co. v. Commissioner (1923), 262 U. S. 679, 43 Sp. CL 675.
24Nung Fung Ho v. White (1922), 259 U. S. 276, 42 Sp. Ct. 492; IKuock Jan Fat
v. White (1920), 253 U. S. 454, 40 Sp. Ct. 566.

'"Intemational
Shoe Co. v. Federal Trade Commission (1930), 280 U. S. 291, 50
Sp. Ct. 89; Dohany v. Rogers (1930), 281 U. S. 362, 50 Sp. CL 299; HardwareDealers Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden (1931), 284 U. S. 151, 52 Sp. Ct. 69; Tagg Bros.
v. Moorehead U. U. S. (1929), 280 U. S. 420, 50 ;p. Ct. 220; Phillips v. Commonwealth (1930), 283 U. S. 589, 51 Sp. Ct. 608.

RECENT CASE NOTES
court of justice. 26 A full hearing before an impartial tribunal implies both
the privilege of introducing evidence and the duty of rendering judgment
in accordance with the evidence introduced.27 To refuse to consider such
evidence or to make a material finding without evidence is an arbitrary
action and subject to judicial review. 2 8 However, an order, based on conflicting evidence, is not arbitrary.29 It is generally held that the finding
of a commission is conclusive, unless there has been some irregularity in the
procedure or some error in the application of the law.30
It is submitted that in the instant case, no question of substantive
law was involved, or at least none was properly asserted. Therefore the
case falls into that class, in which the administrative method is properly
used. The appellant was not denied due process, since he had been given
notice and a full hearing before an impartial tribunal. However, if it were
conceded, that there was a question of substantive law involved, it is submitted that the decision is correct in that the statute provided for an appeal
to the higher court, which right of appeal the appellant exercised.
The fidelity of an award by a commission, in workmen's compensation,
without a judicial determination of both law and facts, has been submitted
to the United States Supreme Court only where it has arisen under an
elective act, and it was held that a judicial review of the facts was not
necessary. 3 1 However, it is still a question whether or not, finding of facts
by commissions, under compulsory compensation laws, should be subject to
a determination of the entire issue by a judicial tribunal upon its own
independent judgment. It seems neither logical nor expedient that such a
rule should be carried over into compensation procedure, since awards by
similar bodies have held to be conclusive, where there has been a proper
procedure before an impartial tribunal.32 Yet such a rule, which must be
accepted as the law, was laid down in Ohio Valley v. Ben Avon Borough,3 3
and in Crowell v. Benson,3 4 which went even farther and stated that there
must not only be an independent determination by the judiciary, but a trial
do nova. The rule of Ben Avon 35 may be explained in that it was a case
illustrative of confiscation and involved a substantive right, but no such
-6Murray v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co. (1855), 18 How. (U. S.) 272;
Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U. S. 71 (1902) (suit over funds not turned over) ; Ex Parte
Wall (1882), 107 U. S. 265; Hurtado v. California (1884), 110 U. S. 526.
27 Chicago Injunction Case (1923), 264 U. S. 258; Interstate Comme-rce Comm.

v. Louisville and Nashville (1912), 227 U. S. 88; Lehigh Valley R. R. Co. v. U. S.,
243 U. S. 412 (1916).
=Florida,E. C. R. Rd. Co. v. U. S. (1913),

234 U. S. 167; Interstate Commerce
Comm. v. Louisville and Nashville (1912), 227 U. S. 88.
" Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co. (1914), 236 U. S. 412; Mills v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co. (1914), 238 U. S. 473.
33
Dunlap v. Black (1888), 128 U. S. 40; Virginia B. R. Co. v. U. S. (1928), 272
U. S. 658.

=Booth Fisheries Co. v. Commissioner (1926),

271 U. S. 208; Hawkins v.

Bleakly (1916), 243 U. S. 210.
3
2 Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co. (1914), 236 U. S. 412; Mills v. Lehigh Val-

ley R. R. Co. (1914), 238 U. S. 473; Williamsport Wire Rope Co. v. U. S. (1928),
277 U. S. 551.
- (1919), 253 U. S. 287.

(1932), 52 Sp. Ct. 285.
11 Supra, Note 33.
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explanation suffices for Crowell 4 Benon, 3 6 since it was a decision interpreting the Longshoreman's Act,37 a compensation law. However, the minority pointed out that no other lower federal court had allowed a trial
de nova, while they had generally held that a record of the findings of the
deputy commissioner must be accepted as conclusive, unless there was
some irregularity in the proceedings before him.38
It is submitted that, unless a fundamental or substantive question of
law is involved, the administrative method of making awards should be
final asto facts, where there has been proper procedure before an impartial tribunal. To hold otherwise would defeat the purpose of such legislation to furnish a prompt, continuous and inexpensive method of dealing
with a class of questions of fact, which are peculiarly suited to an examination and determination by an administrative agent, who is especially
fitted and assigned to the task and where there is great public interest in
summary action, and would make it a mere ministerial body of the court.39
J. H. H.
EVIDENCE-CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-SELF-INCRIMINATION APPLIED TO
METHOD or IDENTIFICATION-It appeared from the testimony of the assistant cashier that the person who robbed the bank had worn a mask and
had about a two-day growth of beard on his face. Defendant was held in
jail several hours preceding his identification that he might develop a beard
to correspond to that worn by the bank robber. When defendant was
brought before the assistant cashier, a handkerchief was placed over his
face in, as he contends, violation of his constitutional guarantee against
being forced to testify against himself. Held, defendant was not forced to
testify against himself.'
The Constitutions of the United States2 and of Indiana3 guarantee the
freedom from compulsory self-incrimination in their respective jurisdictions.
The rule, however, originated as a mere rule of evidence in the common
law as a protest against the inquisitorial methods of interrogating accused
persons which reached their climax in cruelty in the Star Chamber in England.4 It has been codified by constitutional or statutory enactments in
the United States, which codification is merely declaratory of the common
law, neither limiting nor enlarging it.5
The privilege has generally been held to protect a person from any disclosure sought by legal process against him as a witness. 6 Consequently, it
would seem that it should apply only to testimonial evidence by word of
mouth, and not to physical facts, and the text writers have so expressed
"Supra, Note 34.
March 4, 1927, 33 U. 8. C. A., § 904.
MSupra, Note 30.

1 Thompsonv. Hoch (iy.

1895), 33 S. W. 96.

21oss v. State (Ind. Sup. Ct., Oct. 26, 1932), 182 N. E. 865.
2United States Constitution, Amendment V.
3 Indiana Constitution, Article I, Sec. 14.
44 Wigmore (2d Ed.), Sec. 2250 (1923) ; Jones (3d Ed.), Evidence, See. 884,
(1924).

5Counselman v. H tchcok (1892), 142 U. S. 547, 35 L. Ed. 1110, 12 Sup. Ct
195; Emery v. State (1899), 101 Wis. 627, 78 N. W. 145.
6Wigmore, op. cit., Ge. 2263.

